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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROTECTING 
ACCESS TO CARE ACT OF 2017’S CAP ON NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 
 
Kaeleigh P. Christie† 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the support of the Trump Administration,1 the Protecting Access to Care 
Act of 2017 (PACA) passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 218-210 on 
July 28, 2017.  This legislation, proposed by Representative Steve King (R-IA-4), 
“establishes provisions governing health care lawsuits where coverage for the care 
was provided or subsidized by the federal government, including through a subsidy 
or tax benefit.”2  Those whose health plans fall under Medicare and Medicaid will be 
affected by this legislation.3  Likewise, veterans, servicemen, and their families will 
also be affected.4  Further, those who have received their health care under an Af-
fordable Care Act Exchange will be subjected to the provisions of this healthcare 
reform, as well as those with “any insurance plan – including any employer-spon-
sored plan – that receives any tax credits from the federal government.”5 
The provisions of the Protecting Access to Care Act include a three-year statute 
of limitations on medical malpractice cases, constraints on plaintiff’s attorney fees, 
and joint-and-several liability with a fair share rule where a defendant in a lawsuit 
would only be liable for damages equal to his percentage of responsibility in the neg-
ligence.6  However, the most controversial provision in the bill is that which places 
a cap on a plaintiff’s noneconomic damages at $250,000 in medical malpractice 
suits.7  Whether the patient harmed by the negligence of a medical professional or 
                                                          
†   J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; B.A., The George Washington University, 2016.  I 
would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation’s editing team for their hard work 
and assistance in this endeavor.  I also would like to thank my family and especially, my grandparents, for all 
their continued belief, encouragement, and support. 
1   Rep. Steve King, et al., H.R. 1215 – Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 
13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/14/hr-1215-%E2%80%93-protecting-access-
care-act-2017. 
2   Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017). 
3   Joanne Doroshow, Congress Moves to Punish Anyone Using the ACA and Medicine, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-moves-to-punish-everyone-using-the-
affordable_us_58b34240e4b0e5fdf6197405. 
4   Id. 
5  Wendy E. Parmet & Elisabeth J. Ryan, “Not Your Grandfather’s Preemption: Proposed Federal 
Preemption of State Medical Malpractice Cases,” PUB. HEALTH LAW WATCH (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.publichealthlawwatch.org/blog/2017/8/23/not-your-grandfathers-preemption-the-imposition-of-
federal-limits-on-state-court-medical-malpractice-cases. 
6  H.R. 1215, supra note 2. 
7  Bill Corriher, The Other Terrible Health Care Bill Pending in Congress, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
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institution is a child, single-mother, Wall Street executive, or senior citizen, this leg-
islation places the value of human life at $250,000 for noneconomic damages.8 
The Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 was introduced by House Republi-
cans as part of their effort to repeal and replace aspects of the Affordable Care Act.  
Representative King contends PACA is “a necessary move to rein[] in healthcare 
spending.”9  Those in support of the legislation argue PACA will “limit unnecessary 
medical tests and procedures,” and therefore will drive healthcare costs down.10  This 
argument rests on the Congressional Budget Office’s projection that PACA will “re-
duce deficits by $50 billion by 2027 by lowering premiums for medical liability in-
surance and by reducing the use of healthcare services prescribed by providers when 
faced with less pressure from potential malpractice suits.”11  Proponents of PACA 
believe doctors will limit their practicing of defensive medicine as a result of the 
legislation.  In turn, it is said this will lower the cost of medical liability insurance, 
since plaintiffs will only be able to recover a limited award from these medical pro-
fessionals and hospitals.12  
House Democrats staunchly oppose the legislation, maintaining the Republican’s 
reduction of healthcare spending explanation for the bill is a front for its true objec-
tive of giving tax breaks to health insurance companies.13  Further, those opposed to 
PACA fear it will “shield negligent doctors from liability.”14  Medical errors are the 
third leading cause of death in the United States, with up to 440,000 Americans dying 
annually from preventable hospital errors.15  These statistics underscore the im-
portance of holding medical professionals liable for their negligence in an effort to 
provoke them to practice with the utmost care when people’s lives are on the line.  
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) states, “additional tests may frankly be 
just good medicine,” implying that defensive medicine is not the horrible, costly prac-
tice those in favor of PACA make it out to be;16  instead, defensive medicine is a 
practice that saves lives.17  Others opposing the Protecting Access to Care Act argue 
it is unfair for the government to put a value on human life with the noneconomic 
damages cap and that the provisions of the bill are particularly harmful for the most 
vulnerable.18 
                                                          
(July 20, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2017/07/20/436343/terrible-health-
care-bill-pending-congress/ (citing H.R. 1215, supra note 2).  The noneconomic damages cap comes with a 
“state flexibility” provision, which declares whether states with pre-existing caps greater or lesser than 
$250,000, are able to keep that capped limit in place. 
8  Doroshow, supra note 3. 
9  Kimberly Leonard, House Passes Medical Malpractice Bill, WASH. EXAMINER (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/house-passes-medical-malpractice-bill/article/2627374. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospital Care, J. 
PATIENT SAFETY, 9(3): 122–28 (Sept. 2013). 
16  Leonard, supra note 9.  
17  Id. 
18 Seth Moulton, Vote Explanation for H.R. 1215–Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, MEDIUM 
(June 30, 2017), https://medium.com/@teammoulton/vote-explanation-for-h-r-1215-protecting-access-to-
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Further, those opposed to the bill assert that this legislation impedes on states’ 
rights.19  According to this argument, the Protecting Access to Care Act would 
“tak[e] power away from local juries to decide individual cases, and consolidat[e] 
that power in the hands of D.C. politicians.”20  Eighteen House Republicans voted 
against PACA,21 contending the bill diminishes state authority to the will of an ex-
panding federal government.22  Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, stated 
the bill was a “sweeping effort to federalize tort law with our system of federalism, 
which reserves that province solely to the states.”23  
Part I of this Note will discuss the Protecting Access to Care Act’s provision 
capping noneconomic damages in malpractice suits.  In Part II, this Note will briefly 
examine the unsuccessful history of federal medical liability reform regarding caps 
on noneconomic damages.  Part III will argue why PACA’s provision capping none-
conomic damages is unconstitutional on the grounds of equal protection, due process, 
right to trial by jury, separation of powers, and unlawful federal preemption of state’s 
rights.  Finally, Part IV is a conclusion, summarizing the complete analysis, and 
providing recommendations of how the legislation should properly go about tort re-
form and combatting the high cost of health care in the United States.  
 
I. PACA’S NONECONOMIC DAMAGES PROVISION 
 
 Where economic damages refer to monetary losses such as lost wages and med-
ical expenses, noneconomic damages are “subjective losses that are more difficult to 
quantify.”24 Noneconomic damages include pain and suffering; emotional distress; 
loss of enjoyment of life; and life chances, such as loss of consortium.25  Pain and 
suffering compensates victims for injuries such as paralysis, physical trauma, and the 
inability to reproduce.  When noneconomic damages are capped, the type and sever-
ity of a victim’s pain and suffering is irrelevant to the limited award they are able to 
                                                          
care-act-of-2017-2fcb440af340.  The provisions of PACA which cap noneconomic damages and limit the 
amount of attorney’s fees the plaintiff’s attorney can collect raises the argument that minorities, women, and 
children will be dramatically harmed by this legislation as their economic damages are likely to be insignifi-
cant.  As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys may not jump to take these types of cases as there will not be an enor-
mous financial incentive to do so, prohibiting these groups of people from collecting the restitution they are 
rightfully owed as the result of a hospital or doctor’s negligence. 
19  Leonard, supra note 9.  
20  Id. 
21  Id.  
22  Kimberly Kindy, House Republicans Pass Tort Bill by Slim Margin, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-republicans-pass-tort-bill-by-slim-mar-
gin/2017/06/28/4615938a-5c28-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.c03f9078a0e2.  (Representa-
tive John J. Duncan Jr. (R-Tenn.) states, “[PACA] represents a massive expansion of federal authority.”).  It is 
also interesting to note the hypocrisy in that the vast majority of Republicans are pushing forward legislation 
that federalizes tort law, while they have spent a significant time the past few years trying to repeal and re-
place the Affordable Care Act for exceeding the government’s authority by federalizing healthcare.  Corriher, 
supra note 7. 
23  Id. 
24  Michael Morgenstern, Medical Malpractice Damages Caps: A State by State Comparison, THE EX-
PERT INST. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/medical-malpractice-damages-caps-a-state-by-
state-comparison/. 
25  Id. 
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receive. 
 The provision in the Protecting Access to Care Act that caps malpractice none-
conomic damages reads: 
Noneconomic damages are limited to $250,000, before accounting for re-
ductions in damages required by law.  Juries may not be informed of this 
limitation. Parties are liable for the amount of damages directly propor-
tional to their responsibility.  These provisions do not preempt state laws 
that specify a particular monetary amount of damages.26  
Under this provision, it would not matter whether the injured patient was a family’s 
breadwinner killed during a botched surgery, a child given defective medicine, an 
elderly man with bedsores in a nursing home, or a star athlete whose leg was ampu-
tated due to a doctor’s negligence.27  Each type of person in each different of scenario 
could only receive a maximum of $250,000 for noneconomic damages like pain and 
suffering, even when that athlete will have to deal with phantom pain and the child a 
severe brain injury for the next decades of their lives.  Irrespective of the situation, 
the compensation award for noneconomic damages can never go higher than the 
$250,000 cap set by PACA.28  
 To put this into perspective, “[a] New Jersey jury handed down a $17 million 
verdict to parents who sued a hospital, a doctor and his practice for prematurely re-
moving their teenage daughter from a ventilator, resulting in permanent brain inju-
ries.”29  The jury decided to award the plaintiffs “$5 million for pain and suffering, 
$2 million for potential future lost earnings and $10 million to be used to pay for 
medical care for the rest of her life.”30  The $5 million for pain and suffering is the 
noneconomic damages award.  New Jersey currently has no cap on noneconomic 
damages.  However, if the Protecting Access to Care Act had been in effect when this 
suit was filed, and the family’s health care plan was subsidized by the federal gov-
ernment, the teenage girl’s $5 million for pain and suffering would have been reduced 
to $250,000.  This award’s reduction would occur irrespective of the fact that a jury 
decided the appropriate amount of noneconomic compensation was twenty times 
higher than the limited award, leaving the total award at $12.25 million.  Although 
that award seems significant, it is not at all.  Ten million dollars of that money has 
been calculated to cover the teen’s medical expenses, meaning that money has been 
awarded so the family can pay the cost of the girl’s medical bills arising as the result 
of the malpractice incident.  Moreover, plaintiff’s attorneys typically get one-third of 
their client’s award.  Accordingly, the brain-damaged teen girl and her parents would 
only be receiving about $8 million.  If the girl goes on to live a long life, that $8 
                                                          
26 Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017). 
27 Jordan Puckett, HR 1215: Congress Attempting to Set a Price on Your Loved One’s Life, DOLMAN L. 
(June 15, 2017), https://www.dolmanlaw.com/hr1215/. 
28 Id.  This is the case unless the lawsuit occurs in a state whose cap is grandfathered in via PACA’s 
“Flexibility” provision. 
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million might not even cover all of her future medical expenses, let alone provide her 
with a substitute for an income when she is older and unable to work due to her 
condition or offset the physical pain she has to endure for the rest of her life.  This 
scenario highlights how PACA can significantly alter the awards malpractice patients 
receive, and in turn, significantly affect the future of these victims who rely on those 
awards to take care of them for the rest of their lives. 
 
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM REGARDING CAPS ON 
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 
 
 Republican support for medical liability reform is not a new idea.  Since 2004, 
House Republicans have been pushing for legislation to create federal caps on none-
conomic damages and additional reforms.  However, Republicans have been unsuc-
cessful in their efforts thus far, as their proposed legislations throughout the years 
have passed through the House only to get lost on the Senate’s docket. 
 Republicans’ first big push for medical liability reform fell under the second 
Bush Administration.  In 2005, “Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist proclaimed he 
would seek medical malpractice tort reform with a cap on noneconomic damages.”31  
Accordingly, House Bill 534 and Senate Bill 354 were proposed in an effort to com-
bat doctors’ increasing insurance premiums.32  Both bills sought to “shorten the stat-
ute of limitations for filing a claim, place limitations on access to punitive damages, 
repeal the collateral source rule, restructure settlement by requiring periodic payment 
for future damages, cap contingency fees, abolish joint liability, and cap noneco-
nomic damages at $250,000.”33  Further, House Bill 534 limits the liability of those 
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors whose medical products comply with FDA 
standards.34  The House’s bill was referred to several committees, including the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health, never reaching a 
vote.35  After its introduction, Senate Bill 354 was referred to the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, also with no action taken since.36 
 The second big effort to reform medical malpractice tort liability came in 2011, 
when Representative Phil Gingrey (R-Ga.) introduced House Bill 5, Protecting Ac-
cess to Healthcare Act, on January 24, 2011.37  Gingrey’s bill was a replica of 2005’s 
House Bill 534, which failed to gain any momentum six years prior.38  House Bill 5, 
on the other hand, quickly moved through the House of Representatives, passing with 
                                                          
31  Amanda Edwards, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213 
(2006). 
32  Id. 
33  Id. (citing H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005)); S. 354, 109th Cong. (2005). 
34  Id. 
35 All Actions H.R.534 — 109th Congress (2005–2006), CONGRESS.GOV (2005), https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/534/all-info#actionsOverview-content. 
36 All Actions S.354 — 109th Congress (2005–2006), CONGRESS.GOV (2005), https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/354/all-actions. 
37 Actions Overview H.R.5 — 112th Congress (2011–2012), CONGRESS.GOV (2012), https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/5/cosponsors. 
38 Id.  
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a vote of 223-181.39  Similar to the 2005 bills and the 2017 Protecting Access to Care 
Act, this bill capped noneconomic damages in medical malpractice at $250,000, re-
stricted contingency fees, required periodic payment of future medical damage 
awards, and set a statute of limitations relating to discovery and manifestation of in-
jury.40  However, the 2011 effort ultimately also fell flat and never became law. 
 The present Protecting Access to Care Act directly resembles the bills of past 
medical malpractice liability reform efforts.41  The main difference between PACA 
and prior bills is the fact that PACA exists in the era of Obamacare.  As a result, the 
legislation, if enacted, would have a much further reach than the prior bills, as the 
government inserted itself into doctors’ offices across the country when it created a 
federal mandate on insurance.  Accordingly, the present legislation could reach the 
insurance plans of those covered by Medicare, Medicaid, the Veteran’s Administra-
tion, and any person who received their plan through an Obamacare Exchange or 
whose plan receives any tax credit from the federal government.  Therefore, the leg-
islation would obstruct the states’ ability to govern tort law for millions of Americans 
in its jurisdiction.  To make matters more chaotic, if Republicans are able to success-
fully repeal and replace Obamacare, individuals’ insurance plans are likely to expe-
rience significant shifts before their cases even reach the trial or settlement stage.  
Therefore, it is important that the Protecting to Access to Health Care Act does not 
pass the Senate, not only because of the chaos it is bound to bring upon those insured 
through Obamacare Exchanges, but also because of its unconstitutional provision 
capping noneconomic damages.42 
 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PACA CAP ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 
 There are a number of theories plaintiffs adopt to challenge noneconomic dam-
age caps.43  This Note argues that the Protecting Access to Care Act’s provision cap-
ping noneconomic damages is unconstitutional on the grounds of equal protection, 
right to trial by jury, separation of powers, and wrongful federal preemption of states’ 
rights.    
 
A. PACA VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION 
 The equal protection argument against damages caps is that they “violate [] con-
stitutional rights to equal protection, by dividing tort victims into unequal classes.”44  
                                                          
39  Id. 
40  Protecting Access to Healthcare Act, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005). 
41  H.R. 1215, supra note 2. 
42 Wendy E. Parmet & Elisabeth J. Ryan, Not Your Grandfather’s Preemption: Proposed Federal 
Preemption of State Medical Malpractice Cases, PUB. HEALTH LAW WATCH (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.pub-
lichealthlawwatch.org/blog/2017/8/23/not-your-grandfathers-preemption-the-imposition-of-federal-limits-on-
state-court-medical-malpractice-cases. 
43  Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic Caps Unconstitutional, 69 J. 
MO. B. 344, 345 (2013) (The primary grounds in which the constitutionality of caps on noneconomic damages 
have been challenged include: “(1) access to courts, (2) right to trial by jury, (3) due process, (4) separation of 
powers, (5) privileges and immunities, and (6) equal rights and opportunities.”). 
44  Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, § 29:21. Caps on Damages, Generally—Equal Protection Chal-
lenges, 3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:21 (2017). 
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Equal protection is guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the law.”45 
 A number of states have struck down similar statutes as unconstitutional viola-
tions of equal protection.  Typically, “[c]ourts overturning caps on equal protection 
grounds find there is no rational basis for placing the greatest burden on the most 
severely injured patients, especially when, at best, the caps have only a small impact 
on health care costs.”46  For example, in Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Pa-
tients Compensation Fund, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned the state’s non-
economic damages cap for medical malpractice cases as the statute violated the guar-
antee of equal protection.47  There, the victim suffered an injury during his birth when 
the doctor pulled him out by his head, resulting in a form of palsy.48  After finding 
the doctor negligent, the jury “awarded [the victim] $403,000 in future medical ex-
penses and $700,000 in noneconomic damages (approximately $10,000 a year for the 
rest of his life expectancy).”49  The defense moved to reduce the $700,000 in none-
conomic damages to $350,000 to conform to the state’s cap, which prompted the 
plaintiff to challenge the cap’s constitutionality on several grounds, including equal 
protection.50  The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied a rational basis review, con-
ducting “an inquiry to determine whether the legislation has more than a speculative 
tendency as the means for furthering a valid legislative purpose.”51  The court found 
that the cap created a classification of victims, as it divided victims who suffer more 
than $350,000 in damages from those who suffer less than $350,000.52  Accordingly, 
the less severely injured victims would be able to receive full compensation from a 
medical professional or institution’s negligence, while the more severely injured vic-
tims would only receive partial compensation.  Further, the cap generated another 
division, as it only applied to a single occurrence, which “created issues between a 
single claimant with a claim exceeding the cap and claimants arising out of a single 
incident.”53  Although the legislature’s purpose for enacting the cap was to improve 
the quality of health care,54 the court held that no rational relationship existed be-
tween that purpose and “shift[ing] the economic burden of medical malpractice from 
insurance companies and negligent health care providers to a small group of vulner-
able, injured patients,” since the most severely injured patients were the most affected 
                                                          
45  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
46  Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Finding a Solution that 
Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 135, 149 (2012). 
47  701 N.W.2d 440 (2005). 
48  Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 44.  
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Fish, supra note 46, at 150.  
53  Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 44 (citing Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 462).  “The cap created a classifica-
tion that separated “a single injured plaintiff versus patients with children, spouses, and parents.  A single injured 
patient receives far more than a patient whose family is also affected.”  Fish, supra note 46, at 150 (citing 
Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 617-618).  
54  Fish, supra note 46, at 150-51 (This purpose includes the legislatures goals to “regulate insurance 
rates, discourage the practice of defensive medicine, encourage young physicians to practice in the state, dis-
suade malpractice insurers from the leaving the state, and provide quality health care to the public.”). 
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by the statute.55  Therefore, the court determined the cap created an “undue hardship 
on [this] small unfortunate group of plaintiffs,”56 and “no rational basis exists for 
forcing the most severely injured patients to provide monetary relief to health care 
providers and their insurers.”57  
 In addition, in Estate of McCall v. United States, the Florida Supreme Court 
held the statutory cap on noneconomic damages recoverable in a wrongful death 
medical malpractice action violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Con-
stitution.58  This case involved a maternal death situation, where a patient with 
preeclampsia died shortly after giving birth in a hospital on an air force base in Flor-
ida.59  The patient’s family sued the United States for medical malpractice under the 
Federal Torts Claims Act and was awarded $980,462.40 in economic damages and 
$2 million in noneconomic damages.60  However, the $2 million award was limited 
to $1 million, as Florida had a $1 million statutory cap on medical malpractice wrong-
ful death noneconomic damages.61  The Florida Supreme Court reinstated the initial 
award, holding that Florida’s statute violated the state’s Equal Protection Clause un-
der the rational basis test, as the statutory cap “imposes unfair and illogical burdens 
on injured parties when an act of medical negligence gives rise to multiple claim-
ants. . . [and] does not bear a rational relationship to the stated purpose that the cap 
is purported to address, the alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis in Florida.”62 
 Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the state’s cap on noneco-
nomic damages violated the plaintiff’s right to equal protection.63  In Moore v. Mo-
bile Infirmary Association, the court held the cap “creates a favored class of tortfea-
sors and precluded full recovery for only the most severely injured plaintiffs.”64  
Further, the court observed that there is only a remote connection between health care 
costs and noneconomic damages, holding “the burden on severely injured patients 
outweighed any ‘indirect and speculative benefit that may be conferred on soci-
ety.’”65  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire similarly held the medical malprac-
tice reform at issue violates equal protection, as “it is simply unfair and unreasonable 
to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those per-
sons who are most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation.”66 
 Most recently, on January 9, 2018, a judge in North Dakota ruled the state’s law 
limiting noneconomic damages to $500,000 as an unconstitutional equal protection 
                                                          
55  Id. at 151. 
56  Id. 
57  Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 44 (citing Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 466).   
58  134 So.3d 894, 898 (Fla. 1999). 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 901 (“To satisfy the rational basis test, a statute must bear a rational and reasonable relationship 
to a legitimate state objective, and it cannot be arbitrary or capriciously imposed.”). 
63  Fish, supra note 46, at 151 (citing Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 160-165 (Ala. 
1991)).  
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Peck & Miltenberg, supra note 44 (citing Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 (1980)). 
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violation.67  There, a jury awarded the plaintiff, a woman disabled as the result of a 
surgery, $1.5 million for noneconomic damages, “including pain, suffering, physical 
impairment and emotional distress.”68  The hospital moved to reduce the award to 
the $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages declared in a 1995 state law.69  The 
judge ruled the law capping noneconomic damages was unconstitutional, “violating 
equal protection guaranteed by the North Dakota constitution and by arbitrarily re-
ducing damages for people who suffer the most severe injuries.”70  In reaching this 
decision, the judge determined the legislative record of the law “provided no expla-
nation about how the $500,000 figure was chosen or how it would accomplish the 
Legislature’s health care reform goals of increasing access, controlling costs and 
maintaining or increasing quality.”71  Instead, the judge found that the cap “lets neg-
ligent doctors off the hook in cases where they are responsible for causing great 
harm,” and “fell the hardest on stay-at-home moms, the young and those who 
couldn’t prove large economic loss.”72 
  Accordingly, the Protecting Access to Care Act’s cap on noneconomic damages 
violates equal protection.  While the Equal Protection Clause only applies to the 
states, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
imposes equal protection requirements on the federal government.73  The Protecting 
Access to Care Act caps noneconomic damage rewards at $250,000 for injured pa-
tients and severely injured patients, alike.  Like Ferdon, where the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held the state statute capping noneconomic damages at $350,000 vio-
lates equal protection because it creates classifications based on severity of the injury, 
PACA similarly creates such a classification.  Here, the bill distinguishes the plain-
tiffs who suffer less than $250,000 in damages from those who suffer more than 
$250,000 in damages.  Where plaintiffs in the first class are fully compensated under 
PACA, the most severely injured plaintiffs will only be partly compensated.  As the 
court reasoned in Ferdon, there is no rational relationship between shifting the eco-
nomic burden of malpractice insurance rates onto the small class of victims who are 
severely injured from the negligence of a healthcare professional.74  Not only does 
this reward doctors who negligently injured their patients, but it places an undue 
hardship on the most severely injured victims, as the bill essentially forces them to 
provide monetary relief to the negligent professional and their insurers. 
 In addition, the Protecting Access to Care Act creates another class of division 
between malpractice plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs.  Providing a remedy for tort 
is “one of the most basic and traditional of state functions.”75  There are currently no 
                                                          
67  Amy Dalrymple, N.D. Law Limiting Damages in Malpractice Cases Ruled Unconstitutional, THE 
BISMARK TRIBUNE (2018), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/bismarck/n-d-law-limiting-damages-in-
malpractice-cases-ruled-unconstitutional/article_d9be1b4a-f753-56c6-8775-7f8d1c317c9c.html. 
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70  Id. 
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72  Id. 
73  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
74  Fish, supra note 46, at 151. 
75  Fact Sheet: Federal Preemption of Tort Law, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-federal-preemption-tort-law. 
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federal laws imposing a cap on noneconomic damages for general tort awards, as the 
states have traditionally used their own discretion in determining to impose a limita-
tion on noneconomic damages for tort cases.76  If PACA becomes law, it will be the 
first federal law capping noneconomic damages for a tort claim.  However, its pas-
sage would mean that only medical malpractice plaintiffs will be restricted by the 
damage caps, whereas other negligence victims (e.g. personal injury or products lia-
bility plaintiffs) will be able to continue to recover unlimited amount of noneconomic 
damages (subject to the laws of each state).  Therefore, under PACA, those injured 
by the negligence of healthcare professionals will not have the equal opportunity to 
receive full compensation for the negligent act as other tort plaintiffs.  PACA creates 
a class of disadvantaged plaintiffs and stands for the idea that providing full compen-
sation for a medical malpractice victim’s injury is not as important as doing so for 
other tort victims. 
 Further, PACA’s damages cap violates equal protection as the bill will have “a 
particularly adverse impact on women, children, the poor, and other vulnerable mem-
bers of society.”77  These groups have a more difficult time establishing lost wages 
and economic losses, and are more likely to receive noneconomic damages.78  The 
ABA’s research on federal and state initiatives to impose caps on noneconomic dam-
ages has shown that “caps diminish[] access to the courts for low-wage earners, like 
the elderly, children and women.”79  For example, “[d]amages awarded to females 
are consistently lower than those awarded to males in the same group.”80   
 Income plays a large role in this disparity.  On average, a woman earns seventy-
nine cents on the dollar that a man earns and “annual earnings are less than men’s.”81  
Likewise, women are more likely to suffer noneconomic loss, like emotional injury82 
and loss of fertility, and therefore noneconomic damages hurts them disproportion-
ately, especially when they are being paid at a lower rate than men.83  This same 
analysis applies to immigrants as well.  For example, the median household income 
for Mexican immigrants in 2014 was $37,390, compared to $54,565 for the native-
                                                          
76  Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY 
(June 22, 2017), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-summary.  A 
number of states impose noneconomic damage caps on tort awards such as medical malpractice, products lia-
bility, and general personal injury cases.  Likewise, other states impose no limit on the amount a plaintiff can 
recover for noneconomic damages in a tort award. 
77  John Conyers, Jr., Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr. In Opposition to H.R. 1215, the So-
Called “Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, U.S. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Feb. 28, 2017), https://dem-
ocrats-judiciary.house.gov/news/press-releases/statement-honorable-john-conyers-jr-opposition-hr-1215-so-
called-protecting. 
78  Id. 
79  Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Director, ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, & John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, House Committee on 
the Judiciary (Mar. 21, 2016) (on file with the American Bar Association).  
80  Lisa M. Ruda, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff: Heeding the Warning Signs, 
44 CASE W. RES. L. REC. 197, 231 (1993). 
81  Sonam Sheth & Skye Gold, 5 Charts Show Hoe Much More Men Make than Women, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/gender-wage-pay-gap-charts-2017-3. 
82  Ruda, supra note 80, at 216. 
83  Conyers, supra note 77. 
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born population.84  Therefore, noneconomic damages may be a greater source of re-
covery for immigrants whose incomes are significantly less than natives, and there-
fore would not be able to recover much in terms of loss of wages.  If noneconomic 
damages are capped and the economic wages are lower, attorneys are less likely to 
represent potential plaintiffs belonging to these vulnerable groups.85  Instead, attor-
neys, who receive about one-third of each client’s award, will be more likely to take 
clients who are likely to recover high economic damages that are not capped.   
 Thus, the Protecting Access to Care Act is unconstitutional as it impedes equal 
opportunity for the vulnerable classes of society to recover, as caps on noneconomic 
damages disproportionately hurt these people more than others who are more likely 
to recover greater economic losses. 
 
B. PACA VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares, “[no person 
shall] be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”86  Due 
process is “a fundamental principle of fairness in all legal matters, both civil and 
criminal, especially in the courts.”87  Due process requires the government to respect 
all of a person’s legal rights.  The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates this principle 
to the states, asserting, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”88  The issue of due process typically arises in 
two forms: procedural and substantive.  Substantive due process asks “whether the 
government’s deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or property is justified by a suf-
ficient purpose.”89  In contrast, procedural due process “asks whether the government 
has followed the proper procedures when it takes away life, liberty or property.”90 
Noneconomic damage caps may be attacked on two grounds under the due pro-
cess theory of its unconstitutionality.91  First, a plaintiff may argue that “the cap is a 
violation of procedural due process, meaning the plaintiff has been unlawfully di-
vested of a property interest in the damages without being given an opportunity to be 
heard.”92  Second, it can be argued that caps on noneconomic damages violate sub-
stantive due process, which entails an assessment of “whether the cap is relationally 
related to a legitimate legislative purpose.”93  It should be noted that the analysis of 
                                                          
84  Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Mexican Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states#Income and Pov-
erty. 
85  Letter from Thomas M. Susman to Bob Goodlatte & John Conyers, Jr., supra note 79. 
86  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
87  Due Process of Law, LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=595 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2018). 
88  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
89  Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999) (“Substantive 
due process looks to whether there is a sufficient substantive justification, a good enough reason for such a 
deprivation.”). 
90  Id. 
91  Fish, supra 46, at 151–52. 
92  Id. (citing Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitu-
tional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515, 523 (2005)). 
93  Id. (citing Kelly & Mello, at 523–24).  
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a due process challenge to noneconomic damage caps is similar to the equal protec-
tion challenges, as the two go hand in hand. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio overturned medical malpractice damage caps on due 
process grounds.  In Morris v. Savoy, the Ohio Supreme Court held the state statute 
capping general damages awards at $200,000 in medical malpractice cases not in-
volving death, was unconstitutional.94  There, the jury awarded plaintiffs $216,000 
in total damages, which was reduced to $200,000 due to the cap.95  The court applied 
a substantive due process analysis to determine whether the legislation “bears a ‘real 
and substantial relationship’ to public health or welfare or whether it is ‘unreasonable 
or arbitrary.’”96  The court looked at the purpose of the act, which it determined was 
“aimed at malpractice insurance rates, which had been rising rapidly in the years pre-
vious.”97  The court stated, “we are unable to find. . . evidence to buttress the propo-
sition that there is a rational connection between awards over $200,000 and malprac-
tice insurance rates.”  Instead, the court found there was evidence to the contrary, 
citing Lucas v. United States, where the Texas Supreme Court asserted no rational 
relationship existed between the cap and insurance rates as an independent study 
showed that less than 0.6% of all claims brought were for more than $100,000.98  
Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court held the statute limiting damages to $200,000 
violated due process, and was therefore unconstitutional, as there was no “real and 
substantial relation to public health or welfare.”99 
It is important to note that Morris v. Savoy has been distinguished by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson.100  There, the court “found a con-
nection between the size of awards and malpractice insurance rates.”101  Unlike Mor-
ris, the statute at issue in Arbino allowed for limitless damages for the most severely 
injured plaintiffs.102  Therefore, “the existence of a rational relationship between the 
cap and the reasons for enacting it, along with issues of fundamental fairness, is de-
cisive in determin[ing] whether a damage cap violates due process.”103 
The default standard of review that the courts apply when considering constitu-
tional questions, like due process, is rational basis review.  Under rational basis re-
view, the courts test whether the government’s action is rationally related to a legiti-
mate government purpose.104  In Ferdon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held “no 
rational relationship existed between the legitimate legislative objective of lowering 
                                                          
94  61 Ohio St. 3d 684, 686 (1991).  The statute in question was R.C. § 2307.43 which limited general 
damages in medical claims not involving death to $200,000.  This bill had no exceptions for those suffering 
severe injuries. R.C. § 2307.43   
95  Id. at 685. 
96  Id. at 689. 
97  Id. at 690.  
98  Id. (citing Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex.1988)).  It is important to note that this 
independent study was published in 1979 and, therefore, may not be reflective of medical malpractice litigation 
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99 Id. at 691. 
100 Fish, supra note 46, at 153. 
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103 Id. at 153-54. 
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health care costs and capping noneconomic damages.”105  Further, the court declared, 
“even assuming that a $350,000 cap affects medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums…, medical malpractice insurance premiums are an exceedingly small portion of 
overall health care costs.”106  The court recognized “U.S. health care costs exceed $1 
trillion annually and may reach $2 trillion by 2006.  The direct cost of medical mal-
practice insurance, however, is less than 1% of that total.”107  Therefore, the court 
determined the statute capping damages “would have no effect on a consumer’s 
health care costs.”108   
The Protecting Access to Care Act is unconstitutional under the due process the-
ory, as it violates substantive due process.  PACA’s intended purpose is “to improve 
patient access to health care services and provide improved medical care by reducing 
the excessive burden the liability system places on the health care delivery sys-
tem.”109  The legislature’s idea is that PACA’s caps will cause doctors to limit their 
practicing of defensive medicine, which will lower the costs of medical liability in-
surance.110  Like Ferdon, where the court held there was no rational relationship 
between capping malpractice damages at $350,000 and malpractice insurance rates, 
there is similarly no rational relationship between PACA’s $250,000 cap on noneco-
nomic damages in malpractice cases and the quality of medical care.  In Ferdon, in 
determining no rational relationship existed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned 
capping damages would not have an effect on health care costs, as the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance was only 1% of the total cost of health care in 2006.  Here, the 
substantive due process argument should be viewed under the same analysis.  Pres-
ently, “payouts for medical malpractice lawsuits amount to less than 1% of total 
healthcare costs.”111  Medical malpractice claims and defensive medicine, together, 
only amount to “about 3% of the $3.2 trillion healthcare costs” in the United 
States.112  PACA would only decrease “national health spending by 0.4%.113  As the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in Morris, PACA’s capping of noneconomic 
damages in malpractice suits will have virtually no effect on combatting the health 
care crisis, in which proponents of the act are so adamant about fighting.   
 Similarly, in Morris, the Ohio Supreme Court determined no rational relation-
ship existed between awards over the $200,000 capped limit and malpractice insur-
ance rates, since malpractice costs were less than 1% of the total cost of healthcare 
in the country.  Although Morris was later distinguished by Arbino, the Ohio Su-
preme Court’s analysis should likewise be applied when determining the constitu-
tionality of PACA.  In Arbino, the Ohio Supreme Court held the damages cap did not 
violate due process.  However, there, the statute at issue allowed the most severely 
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injured plaintiffs to recover limitless damages in spite of the cap.  Neither the statute 
at issue in Morris nor the Protecting Access to Care Act provide for limitless damages 
for the most severely injured plaintiffs, which is why this analysis should follow that 
of Morris as opposed to Arbino.  That said, PACA violates substantive due process, 
as there is no rational relationship between reducing the costs of healthcare and cap-
ping malpractice victim’s noneconomic damages at an arbitrary figure of $250,000. 
 
C. PACA VIOLATES THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY 
JURY 
 
In addition, the Protecting Access to Care Act is unconstitutional, because it vi-
olates the right to trial by jury.  Several states have used this argument to hold caps 
on noneconomic damages as unconstitutional.  For example, the Georgia Supreme 
Court held noneconomic damage caps on medical malpractice awards are unconsti-
tutional, as they violate the state constitution’s right to jury trial guarantee.114  Geor-
gia’s constitution states, “[t]he right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”115  In 
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, the Georgia Supreme Court con-
cluded (1) the state constitution guarantees the right to jury trial, because the right to 
jury trial existed at common law; (2) the jury trial guarantee encompasses medical 
malpractice cases, because malpractice actions existed in early American common 
law; (3) the jury’s responsibility to determine damages is included in the right to trial 
by jury; and (4) the state statute that caps noneconomic damages violates the right to 
jury trial by requiring the jury to reduce the reward.116  Accordingly, the Georgia 
Supreme Court concluded noneconomic damages cap unconstitutionally violated the 
right to trial by jury.117  
As PACA is a proposed federal law, the U.S. Constitution is the basis for deter-
mining its constitutionality.  The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as-
serts that: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.118 
Medical malpractice law in the United States has its origins in English common 
law.119  For example, one early English medical malpractice case from 1615 “held 
that both a servant and his master could sue for damages against a doctor who had 
                                                          
114  Jennifer W. Terry, Caps Off to Juries: Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases 
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treated the servant and made him more ill by employing ‘unwholesome medi-
cine.’”120  Current medical malpractice law in the United States “is based on common 
law, modified by state legislative actions that vary from state to state.”121  The Su-
preme Court has also held “the Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to statu-
tory claims unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to ‘sound 
basically in tort,’ and seek legal relief.”122  Therefore, the right to trial by jury extends 
to medical malpractice law in the United States. 
 In addition, the determination of damages falls within the jury’s province to 
decide.  In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the “right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the 
amount of. . . .damages.”123  A cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice cases 
violates the Feltner principle, as “it overrides a jury’s verdict, which includes a de-
termination of the proper amount of noneconomic damages needed to compensate a 
plaintiff based on the evidence presented at trial.”124  A cap “render[s] the jury’s 
verdict advisory, rather than constitutionally secured.”125  Accordingly, the Protect-
ing Access to Care Act would violate the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury 
by impeding the jury’s prerogative to determine damages. 
 
D. PACA BREACHES THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
  
 Further, the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 is unconstitutional as it vio-
lates the principle of separation of powers.  The principle of separation of powers is 
a pillar of American government.  This principle divides the government into three 
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.126  When the Founders wrote the 
United States Constitution, they feared too much centralized power and created these 
branches. 127  Each of these three branches were given distinct, as well as shared, 
powers in order to create a system of checks and balances to ensure the branches did 
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not abuse their authority.  The purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers is to 
ensure that “no one department may interfere with or encroach upon either of the 
other departments.”128  Many state constitutions contain identical language vesting 
judicial power exclusively with the courts, just as Article III does in the United States 
Constitution.129  Caps on damages can be challenged as unconstitutional under the 
theory that “the legislature is encroaching upon the judiciary by enacting laws that 
change or affect court and jury procedures.”130 
 In Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court used a 
separation of powers analysis to conclude the state’s statute imposing a cap on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases was unconstitutional.131  There, a 
mother and daughter sued the hospital, doctor, and nurse involved in the mother’s 
Caesarean section, which led to the daughter’s many permanent injuries, including 
cerebral palsy, cognitive mental impairment, and reliance on a gastronomy tube for 
feeding.132  The Illinois statute was passed to combat the “health-care crisis,” in 
which the availability of medical care in parts of Illinois was reduced as a conse-
quence of “the rising cost of medical liability insurance increas[ing] the financial 
burdens on physicians and hospitals.”133  The statute capped plaintiff’s noneconomic 
damages awards at $1 million against a hospital and its affiliates and $500,000 
against a physician and his business.134  The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately con-
cluded the statute was unconstitutional as it violated the principle of separation of 
powers.  The Illinois Supreme Court explained the statute effected a legislative re-
mittitur, in which “the court is required to override the jury's deliberative process and 
reduce any noneconomic damages in excess of the statutory cap, irrespective of the 
particular facts and circumstances, and without the plaintiff's consent.”135  Further, 
the Illinois Supreme Court deduced the legislature was “unduly encroaching upon 
the fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a jury’s assessment of 
damages is excessive within the meaning of the law.”136  Accordingly, the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled the statute was facially invalid as it violated the separation of 
powers clause in the state’s constitution by exercising powers that belonged to the 
judiciary.137 
 When applying the Illinois Supreme Court’s analysis to the Protecting Access 
to Care Act of 2017, it is evident that the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 
violates the principle of separation of powers.  Article III of the Constitution states, 
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
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 Journal of Legislation 97 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish.”138  Under the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, the jury’s award of non-
economic damages to a malpractice plaintiff is automatically reduced to $250,000, 
irrespective of the facts or plaintiff’s consent, if the award exceeds $250,000.  For 
example, the jury could award a plaintiff $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages, how-
ever, the plaintiff would only receive $250,000 because that is the limit in which the 
law caps these damages.  This action unduly infringes on the inherent power of the 
judiciary as it is a fundamental judicial privilege to determine whether a jury’s cal-
culation of damages is excessive.139  Just as the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Leb-
ron that the Illinois statute “stripped the court of its power to determine whether the 
jury’s award was appropriate,” the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 likewise 
breaches the doctrine of separation of powers by exercising powers belonging to the 
judicial branch.140  As the result of this breach, the Protecting Access to Care Act of 
2017 is unconstitutional and, therefore, should not be passed by the Senate. 
 
E. PACA’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW 
 
 If passed, through the Protecting Access of Care Act of 2017, the fed-
eral government will insert itself into malpractice litigation, which has tra-
ditionally been governed by the law of the states.  For medical malpractice 
cases, twenty-six states currently have noneconomic damages caps, in-
cluding California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Utah, and Oregon.141  These 
caps are not the same for each of these states.  For example, Massachusetts 
caps noneconomic damages at $500,000, Utah at $450,000,142 and Mary-
land at $800,000 as of 2018, to increase $15,000 annually.143  Oregon only 
caps noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases, while other malprac-
tice patients are not limited in their recovery.144  These differences high-
light how state legislatures have used their own prerogative to diversify 
their adoption of malpractice caps.  Conversely, nineteen states, including 
Delaware, New Jersey, and New York, as well as the District of Columbia 
do not have caps on noneconomic damages either because the legislature 
never passed such legislation or prior legislation has been ruled unconsti-
tutional.145  The different approaches of the states in terms of caps on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases highlights the beauty of 
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state tort law—that states have the ability to choose what rules will prevail 
in their civil systems. 
 Federalism is the core underpinning of the United States government.  
Under the United States’ federal system, the government divides power 
between the national government and the states.  The Tenth Amendment 
outlines the basic principle of the American federal system, declaring, 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”146  Tort law is primarily state-based, therefore it should be 
presumed that tort awards fall under the jurisdictions of the states.147  How-
ever, House Republicans efforts to transform medical malpractice litiga-
tion is rooted in Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce via the 
Commerce Clause.148  The Commerce Power stems from two constitu-
tional provision: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.149  The Commerce Clause declares Congress has the authority “to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.”150   The Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the power to take action incidental to the valid exercise of an 
enumerated power.151  The theory is that these clauses provide the federal 
government with the ability to reign in malpractice lawsuits where insur-
ance falls under a federal program such as Medicare or Medicaid.152 
 However, the Protecting Access to Care Act’s one-size-fits-all plan to 
reform medical malpractice is an example of the federal government im-
posing their will on the states.  Granted, PACA allows those states that 
already impose noneconomic damages to keep those damage amounts,153 
but it will force nineteen other states plus D.C. to adopt damage caps, 
seven of which ruled caps on noneconomic damages in malpractice cases 
were unconstitutional.154  Ultimately, this “State Flexibility” provision is 
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not about state flexibility, but instead federal supremacy as it is forcing 
states opposed to malpractice noneconomic damages cap to adopt the will 
of the federal government.  In the United States, “our constitutional system 
of federalism demands that Congress respect that states, not the federal 
government are responsible for state tort law” and “federally mandated 
reform of state tort law is simply not constitutional.”155  
 To address proponent’s commerce clause argument, Congress’ push 
to federalize tort law through PACA exceeds its Commerce Power.  First, 
“by ‘Commerce’, the Founders did not mean everything economic.”156  
“They meant trade among merchants, transportation, commercial paper, 
and a few associated activities.”157  The Founders did not intend “[f]ederal 
control over state judges, state juries, and state tort law.”158  Instead, the 
Founders wanted local control of the courts and structured the Constitution 
to reflect such.159  For example, in A Full Vindication of the Measures of 
Congress, Alexander Hamilton stated Federalist No. 17 implies that “ex-
clusive state authority included the ‘administration of private justice be-
tween the citizens of the same State’.”160  The federal judiciary was enu-
merated jurisdiction over specific laws, not including torts.  With the 
exception of federal territories or enclaves, “state governments retained 
exclusive and plenary authority over [] subjects [such] as torts.”161  Ac-
cordingly, the Protecting Access to Care Act violates the Founder’s design. 
 In spite of this, over the years, America has been transformed into a 
fair-weather federalism system, one in which politicians are “respecting 
limits on federal power only when politically convenient.”162  Congress 
has increased the power of federalism through the Commerce Clause, hav-
ing seen the clause to authorize Congress to regulate about anything it 
chooses.163  However, Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in National Feder-
ation of Independent Business v. Sebelius affirms that “Congress [can] not 
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invade certain core state powers,” in holding Obamacare’s individual man-
date exceeded the Commerce Clause.164  There, the Court found “[a] man-
date that someone buy insurance is not ‘commerce’ as the Constitution 
uses the term.”165  The individual mandate did not regulate commerce ac-
tivity, but instead forced people to participate in commerce.  Likewise, the 
Chief Justice declared the Necessary and Proper Clause did not justify the 
individual mandate as it is not a ‘necessary and proper’ component of in-
surance reform.166 
 Similar to Sebelius, where the Court determined mandating individu-
als to purchase insurance was not commerce, neither is a health care law-
suit.  Where the purchasing of health care itself may be commerce, a law-
suit is not as it is not something that can be purchased or traded.  Further, 
damage caps in malpractice cases are not a “necessary and proper” com-
ponent of health insurance reform, as we’ve learned the cost of malpractice 
claims are less than 1% of America’s $3.2 trillion in healthcare costs.  Just 
as the Court determined Congress could not force people to purchase in-
surance on the basis of the Commerce Clause, Congress likewise cannot 
impose strict malpractice award limitations on state legislatures, judges, 




In sum, the United States Senate should reject the Protecting Access to Care Act 
of 2017 as its provision providing for caps limiting the recovery of noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice suits to $250,000 violates the Constitution.  A fed-
eral cap on noneconomic damages threatens one’s right to equal protection, due pro-
cess, and to a jury trial.  Further, these caps violate the principle of separation of 
powers and encroach on the rights of states to regulate tort law. 
The Protecting Access to Care Act’s noneconomic damages cap breaches one’s 
equal protecting and due process rights.  A federal cap will allow lesser-injured plain-
tiffs to receive full compensation, while the most severely injured plaintiffs are only 
partially compensated for their injuries.  In addition, these caps create further classi-
fications.  First, these caps adversely impact vulnerable members of society like 
women, children, and the poor who are more likely to receive noneconomic damages.  
Second, federal caps on noneconomic damages estrange malpractice victims from 
other tort victims as PACA, if passed, would be the only federal tort law establishing 
a noneconomic damages cap for tort victims.  Consequently, a federal cap will result 
in the economic burden of medical malpractice shifting from negligent doctors and 
insurance companies to a small distinct group of vulnerable injured victims of that 
negligence.  Further, the purpose of the act is to combat the United States’ health care 
costs, especially in regard to insurance rates.  However, there is no rational relation-
ship between the proposed federal cap and insurance rates as medical malpractice 
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claims only amount to less than 1% of health care spending and the combination of 
malpractice claims and defensive medicine amount to less than 3% of the country’s 
health care spending.  Accordingly, the proposed statute capping damages would 
have virtually no effect on a consumer’s health care costs, nor would it play any 
substantial role in reducing insurance costs.  Therefore, this provision capping none-
conomic damages is unconstitutional. 
In addition, the proposed cap infringes upon one’s right to trial by jury.  The 
Supreme Court has held the determination of damages is within the jury’s province 
to determine and a cap on noneconomic damages renders a jury verdict as advisory 
as opposed to constitutionally procured.  Also, PACA’s noneconomic damages cap 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers as it essentially is a legislative remittitur 
which encroaches on a judge’s entitlement to determine whether the jury’s assess-
ment of damages is excessive.  Further, this provision calls for the wrongful preemp-
tion of state tort law, an area of law that has historically been left to the states, as it 
allows the federal government to wrongfully impose its will on the states. 
Therefore, the Senate must reject the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 in 
its entirety.  Even if this provision is taken out of the bill, other provisions including 
those on statute of limitations and limitation attorney fees pose constitutional ques-
tions.  If Congress is adamant about reforming medical malpractice lawsuits, it should 
introduce its insurance company lobbying friends to local state representatives as the 
tort reform should be left to the states to regulate under their police powers.  Further, 
if the cost of health insurance is as important to the members of Congress who favor 
the Protecting Access to Care Act as they say, they should target their efforts towards 
combatting bigger, more expensive problems.  For example, the government can 
begin fighting the diabetes epidemic as the total cost of diabetes and prediabetes in 
the U.S. reached $327 billion in 2017.167  Similarly, the government can begin tar-
geting the high cost of prescription drugs, as “the price tag last year in the United 
States was $425 billion, one out of every 10 health care dollars spent, and rising.” 168   
However, the government must not shift the costs of medical malpractice from neg-
ligent doctors and their insurance companies to severely injured victims of their neg-
ligence because this poses several concerning threats to constitutional protections.  
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